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Abstract
Does the partisan character of governing parties play a role in the formation of fiscal
policy? The conventional view is that the left tends toward excessive deficits while the
right practices a more prudent and restrictive fiscal policy. However, there is little
evidence that would sustain such a view. At the same time, some strong arguments
have been advanced which hold that whatever room existed previously for partisanship
in fiscal policy making has been sharply reduced if not eliminated by developments
such as greater international financial interdependence in recent decades. These
issues are examined with a series of models that have been estimated using data from
14 OECD countries for the period from 1961 through 1991. The evidence produced in
this paper suggests that the relationship between partisanship and fiscal policy is
contingent on macroeconomic conditions. The left has tended to treat fiscal policy as
a counter-cyclical tool, tightening fiscal policy when aggregate demand is high and
loosening it to stimulate the economy when demand is low. On the other hand, the
right has either refrained from such activism or actually conducted procyclical fiscal
policies. The evidence also suggests that these partisan-based differences have been
reduced over the recent decades.
Zusammenfassung
Bestimmendie parteipolitischen Konzeption der an der Regierung befindlichen Parteien
deren Fiskalpolitik? Üblicherweise wird davon ausgegangen, daß die Linke eher zu
exzessiven Defiziten neigt während die Rechte eine eher vorsichtige und restriktive
Fiskalpolitik betreibt. Dieser Einschätzung fehlt allerdings die empirische Basis.
Gleichzeitig sind gewichtige Argumente dafür vorgebracht worden, daß die in den
letzten Jahrzehnten gewachsene Abhängigkeit von den internationalen Finanzmärkten
den fiskalpolitischen Handlungsspielraum drastisch eingeschränkt, wenn nicht sogar
beseitigt hat. Diese Fragen werden anhand einer Reihe von Modellen überprüft, die
mit Daten von 14 OECD-Ländern von 1991-1991 geschätzt wurden. Die Tests zeigen,
daß die makroökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen ganz wesentlich die Beziehung
zwischen parteipolitischer Orientierung und Fiskalpolitik bestimmen. Die Linke neigte
dazu, Fiskalpolitik antizyklisch einzusetzen, indem sie eine restriktivere Politik verfolgt,
wenn die Gesamtnachfrage hoch war, und bei geringer Nachfrage eine liberalere Politik
bevorzugte, um die Wirtschaft zu stimulieren. Die Rechte dagegen hat sich eines
solchen Aktivismus enthalten oder tatsächlich eine prozyklische Fiskalpolitik verfolgt.
Die empirischen Resultate zeigen darüber hinaus, daß diese parteipolitischen
Unterschiede im Verlaufe der letzten Jahrzehnte geringer geworden sind.
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Introduction
With the trials and tribulations besetting numerous members of the European
Union in their efforts to meet the Mastricht criteria and as American politicians engage
in a macabre dance around the sacrosanct goal of a "balanced budget," the fiscal
policies of governments have received a great deal of public and scholarly attention in
recent times. One aspect of the fiscal policy problem that has attracted some concern
is the putative link between the ideological proclivities of governing parties and their
tendency to engage in deficit spending. Plainly put, parties on the left are seen as
prone to engage recklessly in deficit spending, while parties on the right are seen as
fiscally prudent. As pointed out below, this characterization of partisan influences on
fiscal policy has received little empirical support in the work of scholars. Further, there
are good reasons to believe that a far more complex relationship holds between
partisanship and fiscal policy, a relationship which itself has not remained constant over
time.
In the following, I outline this complexity and evaluate the evidence that bears on
it. Sinceno onehas systematicallyexplored the facetsof this complexity simultaneously,
I then go on to specify and estimate a set of models that seek to capture its core. The
results can be summarized briefly here. Under favorable labor market conditions (full
or near full employment), left-dominated government take far more restrictive fiscal
stances than do right-dominated governments. What further distinguishes the left from
the right in terms of the fiscal stance they adopt when governing is that the left is sensitive
to high levels of unemployment and engage in counter-cyclical fiscal policy. On the
other side of the political spectrum, the right either ignores the problem or engages in
restrictive fiscal policy when confronted with worsening labor market conditions.
However, in conformity with the frequently made argument that increasing globalization
has reduced the policy latitude of national governments, the results reported here do
indeedsuggest thatpartisan-based differences in fiscal policy havebecome more muted
over time.
Partisan Political Explanations of Fiscal Policy
In one of the earliest systematic empirical studies of fiscal policy, Andrew Cowart
(1978) set out to evaluate the forces shaping governments’ fiscal policies in Western
Europe. A prime hypothesis considered in that work dealt with the effects of the partisan
character of government. The way Cowart formulated this hypothesis corresponds to
a rather primitive concept of what motivates a party controlling the government. Simply
stated, left-dominated governments will have higher deficits than governments
dominated by the right. The source of this difference is the putative disregard the left
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has toward deficits as it pursues dramatic growth in public expenditures over time. The
left will spend regardless of both the revenue levels accruing to government and
macroeconomic conditions (Cowart, 1978, p. 432).
I will point out below that there are a number of reasons to question this view.
Briefly stated, others, including Cowart himself, have suggested that this is a misleading
characterization of reality for which there is little if any evidence. Indeed, some, for
example, Persson and Svensson (1989), have argued that parties on the right have
the incentive to engage in fiscal imprudence while those on the left lack such an
incentive.
Still others, for example, Carlsen (1997), suggest that the ideological character
of governing parties play a contingent role in fiscal policy and that role is shaped by
macroeconomic conditions. Hence, parties on the left will follow a counter-cyclical
policy, loosening fiscal policy when demand slackens and tightening it when demand
surges. Thus, the left will only engage in deficit spending when economic conditions
demand it. Simultaneously, parties on the right are seen as engaging in procyclical
policies and particularly prone to engage in tightening fiscal policy as demand slackens
and unemployment rises.
Finally, economic interdependence, which has grown significantly over recent
decades, is seen as a reason why all of the arguments above are incorrect (e.g., Garrett
and Lange, 1991; Scharpf, 1992). In this image, the ever greater openness of national
economies has dictated that fiscal policy not be used as an instrument to manage the
economy and thereby restricted the latitude with which governing parties ideological
preferences can be expressed in their policies. In other words, there has been a
convergence of right and left with no notable distinctions between their fiscal policies.
Ultimately, then, three questions need to be considered. First, if there are
partisan-based differences in fiscal policy, holding all other conditions constant, is it the
left or the right that is more prone to loose fiscal policy? Second, is the impact of
partisanship independent of other conditions, or is it contingent on macroeconomic
conditions? Third, if any partisan-based differences in fiscal policy existed in the past,
whether independent or contingent, have they remained constant or have they been
reduced if not eliminated through the pressures of globalization?
Based on their cross-national analysis of the fiscal policies of a large number of
OECD countries and drawing on their results regarding the differences between
left-oriented and right-oriented governments, Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1993, p.18)
concluded that "[l]eft wing governments have one-half a percent [of GDP] higher real
fiscal deficits per year in office." This result is certainly in conformity with what Hahm,
Kamlet, and Mowery (1995, p.9) characterize as the conventional or "popular wisdom,"
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which associates the left with deficit spending and the right with fiscal prudence.
Particularly the commitment of left parties to the Keynesian paradigm as well as the
welfare state lead them to run up deficits and amass ever greater burdens of debt. By
implication, the right, with its commitment to a lean (if not impoverished) state and a
vibrant and large private sector eschews negative balances in the public household.
However, there is an array of evidence from other research that contradicts
Alesina, et al’s findings. For example, Peters (1991) results suggest that the partisan
composition of government alone is not related to deficits. Cowart’s (1978, p. 434)
study of seven West European countries also could find no evidence confirming the
proposition that left governments tend to run more sizable deficits than do conservative
governments. Cowart’s results were also confirmed by Robertson’s (1982) analysis of
the effects of the partisan composition of national legislatures on fiscal policy in 9 OECD
countries during the period from 1950 through 1975. In addition, De Haan and Sturm
(1994, pp. 162-165), in their study of fiscal policy within the members of the European
Community during the 1980s, also report that the partisan composition of government
is unrelated to differences in the growth of public debt. Finally, Hahm, Kamlet and
Mowery’s (1996) pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of deficits in nine OECD
countries during the period from 1958 to 1990 also failed to detect any effect of
partisanship.
Interestingly, a number of other studies have come to the conclusion that the
partisan impact on fiscal policy is just the opposite of the conventional wisdom. For
example, David Cameron’s (1985) analysis of developments in the OECD countries
over the period from the mid-60s to the early 80s led him to conclude that
"... the magnitude of deficits over an extended period varies with the
partisanship of government. The nations in which government was usually
controlled by leftist parties are usually less likely to incur large budget deficits
than those in which government was controlled by centrist, Christian
Democratic, or conservative parties -- in spite of the fact that leftist-dominated
parties were much more likely to increase government spending to high
levels" (Cameron, 1985, p. 259).
In other words, if there is a straightforward partisan partiality in fiscal policy it is for the
left to be adopt a more conservative stance than the right.
Such a conclusion can also be derived from Garrett and Lange’s (1991)
cross-sectional analyses of the OECD countries fiscal policies. These analyses show
results which indicate that political systems with left governments and strong labor are
quite distinguishable from those lacking both these conditions. The former systems
have the tendency to run smaller budget deficits than do the latter (Garrett and Lange,
1991,pp. 548-555).
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Indeed,Cameron’s as well as Garret and Lange’s resultsappear to be in conformity
with the argument made by Persson and Svensson (1989) which directly contradicts
the conventional wisdom. Persson and Svensson point out that deficits have a great
attraction for the right. This follows from the time inconsistency problem faced by a
right-controlled government that can not be sure that it will be reelected. This has the
impactof leading it to run fiscal deficitsand thereby insure thata successor left-controlled
government can neither innovate and create new spending programs nor expand
existing programs. Deficit spending for the right has another benefit in that it allows
such parties to favor their constituencies by cutting taxes.1 A potential left-wing
successor government is thus caught in a fiscal squeeze. It would be forced to choose
among the following unattractive options: the unpopular option of increasing taxes
simply to maintain present program spending levels, cutting back on spending and
thereby disappointing its constituents, or maintaining both but creating a large and
non-sustainable debt burden that also would further squeeze spending programs by
the need to cover the ever larger interest charges.
As is often the case with conventional wisdom, the popular view may be an
oversimplification or a misleading image of a complicated reality. Buchanan and
Wagner (1977) suggest that since deficits can be justified by an appeal to the Keynesian
paradigm, politicians (and who more than those on the left?) are bedazzled by the ease
of funding new and ever more expensive programs that they do not heed the maxim
that fiscal policy needs to be counter-cyclical, i.e., deficits are justified only in periods
of slackening demand and that surpluses are needed when demand is rapidly
expanding. Further, their own voracious rent-seeking can find an outlet when prudent
fiscal constraints are loosened, a situation less likely to occur with governments that
position themselves on the right wing of the political spectrum.
A more reasonable interpretation of the conjunction of Keynesian principles and
partisan-based policy would suggest that the position of the left, given its constituency
of the more economically vulnerable among the electorate, would be one of willingness
to use fiscal policy as an instrument to control aggregate demand while the right
foreswears the use of the instrument because it only interferes with the natural workings
of an efficient market system. It follows that under conditions of slack aggregate
demand, the left’s fiscal stance would be to stimulate that demand by lowering taxes
or increasing spending and thereby pushing the balance toward or into a deficit. Where
1 . The results from Ohlsson and Vredin’s (1996) study of Swedish fiscal policy from
the late 1960s through the early 1990s also bears out this argument. While conservative
governments were prone to cut both expenditures and revenues, their tendency was
to reduce the former to a far smaller extent than the latter -- thereby generating greater
deficits than Social Democratic governments.
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demand is excessive, it would tighten fiscal policy and move toward surpluses in the
public household. The right, however, would not respond to slackening demand, seeing
it as a natural outcome of market workings which will later correct itself. If anything,
the right might be tempted to follow a pro-cyclical policy, particularly under conditions
of slack demand, thereby aiding capital in disciplining labor when the latter is already
weak.
This general line of argument has been advanced by Cowart (1978, pp. 432-438)
who postulated that ideological or partisan differences in fiscal policy was to be seen
in the dissimilar responses the left and right would have to a problem such as
unemployment with the left being far more responsive. This is a position elaborated
on and tested recently by Carlsen (1997) within Hibbs’ (1977) partisan theory
framework.2
In keeping with the central tenets of partisan theory, Carlsen (1997, p. 145) argues
that political parties attempt to pursue policies that conform to their constituencies’
preferences. Unemployment is of particular concern for supporters of left parties and
it follows that such parties place a premium on insuring low levels of unemployment.
On theother side, the supportersof rightist partiesplace greater emphasis on minimizing
inflation and therefore have an aversion to expansive stimuli flowing from fiscal and
monetary policy. It is in the interest of right wing parties to follow the preferences of
their constituents and this would lead the right to refrain from using fiscal policy to steer
the economy. Given these conditions, parties on the different wings of the political
spectrum will be distinguishable by their responses to slackening demand and
unemployment. Those on the left are far more likely than those on the right to use fiscal
policy to counter this macroeconomic problem. Thus, it is expected that the fiscal policy
of left-dominated governments would be more sensitive to high or rising unemployment.
What further distinguishes the two parties as well is the tendency of the left to be
consistent in their policy when macroeconomic conditions are quite good. In such times
they are far more likely to pursue contractive fiscal policies in order to assure that debt
does not become unsustainable, particularly over the course of the next business cycle.
Carlsen tested this general hypothesis using a pooled cross-sectional time-series
design for 18 OECD Countries during the period from 1980 through 1992. His analyses
led him to conclude that the "results are supportive of partisan theories," in that
"[g]overnment ideology has a significant impact on the deficit when unemployment is
expected to be high or increasing but no significant impact when unemployment is
2 . See Hibbs (1992) as well as Schmidt (1996) for broad overviews of partisan theory
and the relationship between partisanship and public policy, respectively.
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expected to be low or falling" (Carlsen, 1997, p. 146). However, while generally
supportive of the notions that the partisanship of a government alone does not have
an effect on deficits, and that left-dominated governments respond to high levels of
unemployment in their fiscal policy and right-dominated governments do not, the results
do not lend themselves to being interpreted as supportive of the other part of the
hypothesis, namely, that left-dominated governments will run more restrictive fiscal
policies in the absence of high unemployment.
Less supportive of the thesis that the linkage between partisanship and fiscal
policy is contingent on the macroeconomic context is the earlier study by Cowart.
Although he concludes that the left is more responsive to unemployment than the right,
the statistical results that he generated from his study seem less than convincing.3
In more recent times the utility of an activist fiscal policy has been cast into doubt.
For example, the linkage between fiscal deficits and monetary policy when growth in
money has been a central policy objective tends to undermine the utility of fiscal policy.
Also, the general slow-down in economic growth across the OECD countries creates
structural problems. But perhaps, most importantly, many consider the significant
increase in the degree of international integration as undermining national policy
autonomy (Artis, 1987; Helleiner, 1994). The fact that these parameters have changed
necessarily calls into question whether parties, regardless of their ideological
preferences, would be willing and/or able to use fiscal policy in pursuit of their goals.
Indeed, a widely accepted position is that parties today are confronted with severe
constraints on the options they have for domestic macroeconomic policy (see, e.g.,
Scharpf, 1991, Kurzer, 1993, and Iverson, forthcoming). Peters (1991, p. 118) also
suggests that the economic demands generated by the world market have weakened
any linkage between partisanship and fiscal policy.4
Garrett and Lange (1991) set out to evaluate this position. They argued that while
the effects of interdependence have not reduced partisan differences in terms of
"supply-side policies," nevertheless, they have altered government strategies in terms
3 . In the table where Cowart (1978, Table 3, p. 436) reports statistical findings on a
model of fiscal policy with partisan effects conditional on macroeconomic conditions, it
would appear from the notation being used that he found evidence in support of this
hypothesis in only one of the five countries for which he reports results.
4 . In my own work (1997) I have examined the implications of internationalization and
partisanship on government spending. The results of this analysis suggest that
partisanship still plays the role partisan theory predicts, but that its impact has declined
somewhat over time. Further, internationalization has acted to slow the growth of the
size of the public sector in the OECD countries. Indeed, it may have actually worked
to reduce it.
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of their willingness to employ (as well as the effectiveness of) fiscal and monetary policy
(p. 541). Because of interdependence, "governments no longer possess the autonomy
to pursue independent macroeconomic strategies effectively, even if they were to seek
to do. In anything but the short run, the fiscal and monetary policies of governments
of the left and the right should converge" (p. 543).
They conducted limited cross-section analyses of the OECD countries to assess
the validity of this argument. While the results are supportive of a convergence in the
monetary policy area, they do not support the argument in the fiscal policy area. Indeed,
by their results, political systems with left governments and strong labor are quite
distinguishable from those lacking both these conditions. The former systems have
the tendency to run smaller budget deficits than the latter (Garrett and Lange, 1991,
pp. 548-555).
Garrett’s later (1996, 1997) work takes a much more comprehensive look at this
question. Indeed, his argument goesagainst the grainof the contemporary conventional
wisdom that the latitude for partisanship in macroeconomic policy has been severely
restricted if not eliminated. He points out that there are two very different expectations
one might have about the results of internationalization. The first, which he labels the
"efficiency view," is the now standard argument that higher levels of internationalization
undermine the ability and willingness of governments to carry out expansionary fiscal
policies. The second view, which he labels that of "compensation," suggests that
because of the market dislocations generated by internationalization, left-dominated
governments are even more prone to pursue active fiscal policy in order to offset the
costs of these dislocations.
Garrett’s results, deriving from extensive analyses of the development of fiscal
policies across a large number of OECD countries from the late 1960s through the early
1990s are supportive of the compensation argument. In other words, the greater the
degree of internationalization the more likely it is for national systems with a strong
labor-left to generate higher levels of fiscal deficits. From this, then, one might conclude
that internationalization has not fostered a reduction in partisan-based fiscal policy, but
rather has enhanced it.5
5 . An analysis that runs somewhat parallel to Garrett’s work is to be found in Boix
(1996). However, Boix’s results are less straightforward than Garrett’s. He finds that
the effects of partisanship have shifted over time with social democratic governments
generally proving more fiscally conservative in the 1960s and the 1980s while they
tended to be more expansionary in the 1970s.
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It would seem that no clear answers to the three questions posed at the beginning
of this section can be provided on the basis of extant research. Recall that the first
question was which type of party was generally more prone to run a loose fiscal policy.
Results have been mixed as to whether indeed there exists an non-contingent
connection between the partisanship of government and its fiscal policy. Evidence has
been adduced to show that the left is more fiscally irresponsible than the right, that
there is no difference between the left and the right, and that right is more fiscally
irresponsible than the left. The second question posed the issue as to whether left and
right responded differently to macroeconomic problems in their fiscal policy. Some
evidence has been produced to suggest that the left is indeed more prone to engaged
in counter-cyclical policy than is the right, but the weight of this is not overwhelming
particularly when one considers the information available that might answer the third
question, i.e., has the connection between partisanship and fiscal policy remained
constant or has it changed over time, particularly in light of the structural problems (such
as high unemployment) and the changing international economic context within which
fiscal policy is conducted. Here, again, one sees contradictory conclusions. There is
the position that in more recent times policy latitude has so diminished that there is no
room for partisan preferences to be implemented. Then again, it is reported that despite
the supposedly circumscribed room for maneuver, the left has followed a more fiscally
restrictive policy than the right. And finally, there are indications that the left has
increased its tendency to employ fiscal policy as an instrument to steer macroeconomic
conditions.
One needs to consider why this disarray has come about. A number of factors
may have caused the situation. There is little commonalty across the research designs
of these studies. Not only are the time frames (and country samples) often different,
but more importantly, the models being estimated vary tremendously. They diverge in
terms of what other factors, factors that might reasonably conjectured to be
simultaneously at work, are controlled for. They also vary in considering whether the
expressionof partisanshipmay beconditional on other factors, suchas macro-economic
conditions and the international context. Very few, indeed, take these aspects under
consideration. This suggests that there is a need to reconsider the role of partisanship
in fiscal policy. In order to minimize the problems just outlined, any new effort should
try to explicitly and encompassingly address these issues. The study should be as
extensive as possible in terms of both the time frame and the countries included. It
should also explicitly attempt to deal with other important factors as well as with the
conditionality that may mark the expression of partisanship in fiscal policy. In the next
section such an effort is undertaken.
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Modelling Fiscal Policy
In order to explore the three critical issues outlined in the previous section, a set
of three models have been formulated. The set of the models is intended to detect the
ways, if any, in which fiscal policy is influenced by the partisan character of government
while at the same time controlling for other factors that also would or could influence
this policy. The way in which fiscal policy and the other variables in the models have
been measured are first described. Then, the models themselves are introduced.
Following that, the results from pooled cross-section time-series analyses of these
models are presented. Data limitations restricted the analyses to a set of 14 countries
with the time frame running from 1961 to 1991.6
The public sector household balance (as a percent of GDP) is the measure of
fiscal policy employed here. The variable is the net lending item of the general
government financial accounts. Net lending is difference between government
expenditures, both current and capital, and all government revenues. A surplus is
positive net lending, while a deficit is negative net lending, in other words, borrowing.
More encompassing than central government balances, it also includes the financial
accounts of social security funds, regional and local governments.7
An index intended to capture the governing parties’ collective position on a left-right
scale has been constructed and introduced into the model. It represents what Gross
and Sigelman (1984) describe as a skyline view of party systems. On the vertical
dimension the relative strength of, for example, a party within a coalition government
is portrayed while on the horizontal dimension the "ideological-programmatic" position
of that party is captured. The general formula for this measure of the political center
of gravity for government takes the following form:
G = å
i = 1
n
TiCi
6 . The OECD countries included are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany (West), Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland are
excluded because of the lack of data (for the whole or part of the period) on the fiscal
variable. Greece, Spain, and Portugal are excluded because they were not democracies
during part of the period under study. Size considerations led to the exclusion of Iceland
and Luxembourg.
The time frame was dictated by considerations of data availability. Information on the
fiscal variable is available for only a subset of the 14 countries prior to the 1960s. For
some of the countries, other data were not available after 1991.
7 . The data are drawn from the OECD’s National Accounts, Detailed Tables, Vol. 2
and its 1996 diskette containing the Fiscal Position data set. In the ideal situation it
would be preferable to use the more restrictive definition of government deficit, that is
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where  is party i’s decimal share of cabinet seats, and  refers to party i’s position
on a left-right continuum (Gross and Sigelman, 1984).
To operationalize parties’ positions on the left-right continuum the Castles and
Mair (1984) codings of party’s placement on a left-right scale have been employed.
The Castles-Mair scale is based on expert codings and in organizing the data it has
been modified to range from a low of 1 (extreme left) to a high of 5 (extreme right).8
For purposes of this study, the index, which has been used successfully elsewhere
(Cusack, 1997), has been rescaled by subtracting it from the value 5. Thus, it has a
natural zero value (in this case, extreme right) and ranges up to a high of 4 (representing
the extreme left).
To capture the impulse that would flow from the perceived need to manage
aggregate demand the unemployment rate of the previous year is included in all of the
models. The data are based on national definitions and not the OECD’s standardized
Ti Ci
the balance for the central government including all transfer programs financed and
organized by national legislation as well as the transfers to and from lower levels
(regional, local) of government. Some of the papers cited in the last section claim to
use the central government balance as their dependent variable. However, since they
are using a series from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook they are
actually dealing with cross-nationally non-comparable data series. Sometimes the
country series in this source are not from the consolidated central government accounts
(i.e., they do not include social transfer programs, etc.), and sometimes they are. I
have never observed that any of the authors were aware of this critical problem.
Consolidated central government accounts can be obtained from the IMF’s Government
Financial Statistics Yearbook. However, a serious drawback of this source, particularly
in terms of this paper, is that the series do not extend very far back in time. In the future,
this should prove a valuable resource but for now its usage is limited. I should note
that I have made an extensive effort, working with the disaggregated government
finance statistics tables (central, social security, and what often is labelled state and
local) in the various annual issues of the OECD’s National Accounts, Detailed Tables,
Vol. 2, to reconstruct historical series of consolidated central government accounts for
the OECD countries. Unfortunately, the information provided (particularly with respect
to transfers between government sectors) is insufficient to allow for the proper
construction of consolidated central government accounts.
8 . An extensive number of sources were used in collecting information on governing
parties. The prime sources included: Palaheimo’s Governments in Democratic
Capitalist States, numerous issues of the European Journal of Political Research,
Europa Yearboooks, and Arthur Banks’ Political Handbooks of the World.
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rates.9
The lagged fiscal balance has also been introduced This has two advantages.
First, it helps capture the inertia that often marks government policy-making. In the
end, both spending and revenue decisions shape the fiscal balance. Decisions and
implementation in both there areas are rarely made with alacrity. Second, in terms of
modeling dynamics, whether in a single or pooled time series, the inclusion of such a
variable has a number of methodological advantages (see Beck and Katz, 1995b).
Next, there are two variables that capture the built-in stabilizers of fiscal policy in
all countries. One of these deals with programs representing transfers to and from the
household sector.10 Downturns in the labor market will increase the number of
recipients, particularly in terms of unemployment compensation programs but also
social welfare and security programs. Simultaneously, any such downturn pushes
program revenues below those anticipated and the combination of these two effects is
to move the fiscal balance in a negative direction. Improvements in labor market
performance automatically lower the number of transfer recipients and the public outlays
going to them, while simultaneously increasing revenues through higher tax receipts
generated by the income received by the newly employed. The joint effect of these
latter two changes is to move the fiscal balance in a positive direction. To capture the
impact of changes in transfer program costs the variable, , has been introduced into
the model. represents the change in transfer costs based on the change in the size
of the pool of eligible people and the prevailing level of transfer program generosity.11
D Tt
D Tt
9 . The last year’s unemployment rate and not the present year’s rate is used because
it seems more plausible to assume that significant changes in fiscal policy (by
implication, changes in spending programs and tax laws) would not come about
instantaneously but rather require some time to implement. National definitions are
used because these are the data government officials would be attending to and not
those that provide cross-nationally comparable information. The latter are clearly useful
for describing and modelling processes internal to the labor market. They seem less
relevant in the context of national fiscal policy making processes. The sources of these
data are various volumes of the OECD Labour Force Statistics.
10 . See, e.g., Cowart (1978) and Cusack (1988, 1997).
11 . Note that the variable has been calculated in the following way:
 
where , and in turn, is equal to the ratio of the consumer price
index to the GDP price index; is the percentage of the total population that is either
unemployed or in retirement age; and is the ratio of the percentage of GDP involved
in public transfers (to the household sector) to . Data for these variables come
principally from OECD sources, including various issues of the OECD’s Labor Force
Statistics and its National Accounts, Detailed Tables, Vol. 2. Note that because of the
practice of linking expenditures in such programs to movements in a price index, a
D Tt - 1 = RPt*D DBt*GEt - 1
RPt = RPCt/RPCt - 1 RPC
DB
GE
DB
12 Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy
It is also necessary to control for gaps in actual and projected economic
performance. Both the broad directions of government spending and taxation policies
are fixed prior to their implementation. By implication, of course, the same holds for
the balance between the two. But all of these aggregates, in the end, are simply plans
based on assumptions regarding how well the economy will be doing during the year
in which the budget is implemented. We have seen above that transfer program
expectations can be off the mark because of changes principally in the numbers of
people who might unexpectedly gain or lose eligibility for these programs. General
revenue collections can also be out of line with expectations and this too will move the
fiscal balance in one direction or another away from which it had been targeted. In
order to capture this, which in many ways also reflects a kind of built-in stabilizer, a
variable, E, which is a function of recent growth rate performance relative to the actual
growth rate in the economy is introduced into the model. Specifically it is operationalized
as the average growth rate for the three previous years minus the current growth rate,
where this difference is weighted by the previous year’s ratio of total public spending
to GDP.12 A positive (negative) score indicates that growth was lower (higher) than
might have been expected based on recent trends. With lower than anticipated growth
the planned fiscal balance will necessarily be lower or more negative than had been
anticipated, and vice versa. Therefore, the expectation is that the sign on the parameter
for E should be negative.
Next, because of the argument that the growth of international capital markets
and the accompanying ease with which capital can flow across borders has impelled
all governments to rein in any tendency to engage in excessive fiscal deficits, a measure
of the lack of restrictions of capital flows (O, or Openness) is also included. This index
is based on the data developed by Quinn and Inclan (1997) and takes into account the
lack of controls on the capital and current account as well as international agreements
constraining the right to impose restrictions on the flow of capital.13 The actual measure
employed here is the annual average of the OECD members’ Openness scores.
relative price term is also included within the calculation of this variable (Blöndal, 1986).
12 . This index was first used by Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b). Note, however, here
it is slightly modified by weighting it by the country’s previous year’s ratio of total public
spending to GDP.
13 . My thanks to Dennis Quinn for generously providing me with access to this data
set.
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In the first and simplest of the models to be evaluated, aside from the control
variables, both the government and unemployment variables are introduced
independently. The model takes the following form:
Model 1
If the simple expectation that ideology and ideology alone directly shapes fiscal
policy of the government has any validity, one would expect to see that the parameter
on that variable would be statistically significant and that its sign would reveal whether
left (negative) or right (positive) has the greater propensity for conducting lax fiscal
policy.
Such a result might emerge or not, but nevertheless it is also necessary to assess
whether or not the parameter on the government variable may be misleading in that
either of both its sign and magnitude might be radically different if the unemployment
and government terms are also introduced in a joint interaction form. In order to evaluate
this model 2 has been specified in the following way:
Model 2
The parameters for the two constituent terms, government and unemployment,
and that for the interaction between the two can be interpreted in the following manner.
First, the parameter for the government term alone describes the connection between
the ideologically-based fiscal stance of government when there is full employment, that
is when unemployment is at 0 percent. A negative coefficient would imply greater fiscal
restrictiveness on the part of the right under conditions of full employment while a
positive coefficient would imply greater fiscal restrictiveness on the part of the left with
full employment. Second, the parameter on the unemployment term would, given the
scaling on the government index, represents the fiscal policy stance in response to
unemployment on the part of a far-right government (0 on the index). The sign on the
parameter would indicate how a far-right government sets its fiscal policy in light of
unemployment conditions. Third, the parameter for the interaction of the two variables
SDi , t = a + b 1SDi , t - 1 + b 2D Ti , t + b 3Ei , t + b 4Oi , t - 1 + b 5Ui , t - 1
+b 6Gi , t - 1 + e i , t
SDi , t = a + b 1SDi , t - 1 + b 2D Ti , t + b 3Ei , t + b 4Oi , t - 1 + b 5Ui , t - 1
+b 6Gi , t - 1 + b 7(Ui , t - 1Gi , t - 1) + e i , t
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can be seen as the increment by which the parameter on partisanship (unemployment)
is adjusted if unemployment (partisanship) is not equal to 0. The adjustment is greater
the greater the value of the conditioning variable.14 A parameter that was significantly
(in a statistical sense) different from zero on this term would imply that parties respond
differently in their fiscal policy to unemployment. A negative sign on the parameter
would indicate that the left adopts a more counter-cyclical fiscal stance than does the
right. The size of the parameter would reflect the magnitude of the difference in those
stances.
Models 1 and 2 are based on the premise that partisan differences, if they exist,
in the fiscal policies of the left and right have remained constant over the last three
decades. One way of assessing the validity of this assumption is to specify a third
model that introduces the possibility of differential effects of partisanship on fiscal policy
across three periods. The three periods used here run from 1961 through 1972 (period
1), 1973 through 1979, and 1980 through 1991.15 To do this three separate government
terms, one for each period, and three separate interaction terms (between government
and unemployment), again, one for each period, are introduced. The model takes this
form:16
Model 3SDi , t = a + b 1SDi , t - 1 + b 2D Ti , t + b 3Ei , t + b 4Oi , t - 1 + b 5Ui , t - 1
+b 61(P1Gi , t - 1) + b 62(P2Gi , t - 1) + b 63(P3Gi , t - 1) + b 71(P1Ui , t - 1Gi .t - 1)
+b 72(P2Ui , t - 1Gi , t - 1) + b 73(P3Ui , t - 1Gi , t - 1) + e i , t
14 . Thus, model 2 can be rearranged in the following two ways which illustrate the
conditional effects of U and G on SD for given values of G and U respectively:
15 . Ending the first period at 1972 is intended to allow the supposedly stronger
connection between partisanship and fiscal policy that prevailed in the "Golden Age."
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (in late December of 1971) it is often
argued that this linkage deteriorated. Starting the third period in 1980 is intended to
capture the strong internationalization effects that supposedly came into play during
the 1980s.
16 . Note that the P terms included in the equation represent period dummy variables.
Thus, P1 takes on a value of 1 for the first period, i.e., the years 1961 through 1972,
and a zero otherwise. P2 and P3 are the period dummies for period 2 and 3, respectively.
SDi , t = a + … + b 5Ui , t - 1 + (b 6 + b 7Ui , t - 1)Gi , t - 1 + …
SDi , t = a + … + b 6Gi , t - 1 + (b 5 + b 7Gi , t - 1)Ui , t - 1 + …
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Substantial differences across the three period specific government variables’
parameters would indicate that the fiscal stance being adopted by governments under
conditions of full-employment have undergone change across the three periods.
Likewise, substantial differences across the parameters on the three interaction terms
would reveal that the pattern of partisan-based fiscal policy in light of different labor
market conditions has undergone change through the three periods.
The models have been estimated with ordinary least squares. The residuals from
each model were examined on a country by country basis to determine if there were
any problems with autocorrelation. No such problem was detected. In order to correct
for any heteroskedasticity, panel corrected standard errors (see Beck and Katz,
1995a,b) were estimated and these are used to generate the t-statistics reported.
Table 1 provides the estimation results. Note that the three different models
account for approximately the same amount of variance in the dependent variable when
the R2 measure is corrected for the number of parameters being estimated.17 Across
all three models, the coefficients for each of four variables, the lagged endogenous
variable as well as those for , , and -- change in transfer costs, unanticipated
growth performance, and openness, respectively -- are generally identical. Thus,
ignoring the independent effects of all other variables in the model, approximately 90
of the level of the previous fiscal balance is carried over into the present balance. A
one percent (of GDP) increase in transfer costs acts to lower the balance by about one
percent (of GDP), while a one percent decrease in those costs brings about a rise in
the balance by one percent. Lower than anticipated growth performance decreases
the balance (with a one percent shortfall in weighted anticipated growth generating a
.3 percent of GDP decline in the fiscal balance) while better than anticipated
performance increases it at the same rate. Note that in none of the models is the
estimated parameter on the openness term statistically significant.
Across all three sets of estimates, the parameters on the government terms take
on positive values that are statistically significant. The unemployment parameters are
all statistically insignificant. However, the interpretations one can give to these
estimated parameters differ dramatically. In model 1, the parameter estimate on the
government term would lead one to conclude that, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
left-dominated governments are far more fiscally conservative than are right-dominated
governments and that governments do not respond to the level of unemployment in
setting their fiscal stances.
T E O
17 . Note, however, that the F statistics for the tests of the interactions effects models
against the restricted (main effects) model are significant.
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In models 2 and 3, the interpretations are far more complex because they depend
critically on the parameter estimates for the interaction of government composition and
the prevailing level of unemployment. Thus, in model 2, which postulates that the effects
of government composition have been constant across the 31 years, one would
conclude that under conditions of full or near-full employment, left-dominated
governments are indeed more fiscally conservative than right-dominated governments.
But at the same time, left-dominated governments have been more sensitive to
macroeconomic conditions, specifically unemployment, and have pursued
counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The results also suggest that right-dominated
governments have been indifferent, at best, to considerations of unemployment in their
fiscal policies. Indeed the pattern of their behavior would indicate that they have pursued
pro-cyclical fiscal policies and have behaved, under conditions of full or near-full
employment, in the "stubborn conservative" manner suggested by Persson and
Svensson (1989).
In model 3, an even more interesting pattern of results emerges. First, there
appears to have been a movement in the direction of convergence -- at least in terms
of the use of fiscal policy as partisan-based macroeconomic instrument. The results
for the first part of the estimation period suggest rather strong differences in terms of
partisan responses to unemployment. This diminished sharply in the mid- to late-1970s
and continued through the third part of the estimation period, up to 1991. The results
also lead to the conclusion that under conditions of full or near-full employment, while
partisan differences in fiscal policy became muted in the 1970s, they regained some
strength during the 1980s.
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Table 1
Determinants of Public Sector Balances
Estimation Results from Pooled Cross-Section Time-Series Analyses
Alternative Models
1 2 3
Surplus/Deficit t-1 .90 .89 .89(32.07) (31.46) (31.89)
Change in Transfer Program Costs t -1.11 -1.09 -1.07(-5.72) (-5.67) (-5.61)
Unanticipated Economic Performance t -.30 -.30 -.30(-3.84) (-3.87) (-3.98)
Openness t-1 -.01 -.02 -.08(-0.12) (-0.20) (-0.48)
Unemployment t-1 -.03 .08 .10(1.00) (.1.48) (1.53)
Government t-1 .17 .46(2.13) (3.16)
Government t-1 * Unemployment t-1 -.07(-2.59)
Government 1,t-1 .64(3.61)
Government 2,t-1 .38(2.12)
Government 3,t-1 .53(2.37)
Government 1,t-1 * Unemployment t-1 -.12(-2.41)
Government 2,t-1 * Unemployment t-1 -.07(-1.81)
Government 3,t-1* Unemployment t-1 -.07(-2.11)
constant -.04 -.49 -.04
(-0.04) (-0.49) (-0.26)
.87 .88 .88
n = 434 = 31 years * 14 countries
The t - statistics are enclosed in parentheses and are based on panel corrected standard
errors. The latter were estimated with Beck and Katz’s PCSE source program in
combination with RATS. It was also possible to reproduce these results using the
September 1997 update of SHAZAM 8.0.
R2
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A few words about the substantive and statistical properties of the parameters
associated with the interaction terms are in order here. First, take the interpretation
one can give to the interaction parameters when dealing with them as representing the
change in the slope of the endogenous variable, the fiscal balance, on governmental
partisanship associated with a unit change in the unemployment level. In the first period
the effect of governmental partisanship that is conditional on unemployment moved
from .64 at full employment to .30 at three percent unemployment. These effects were
statistically significant (.05 level).18 Thereafter, however, as the effects continued to
diminish and turn negative they lost statistical significance until unemployment would
have registered a level of 14 percent or more, well beyond the levels reached during
the first period. In the second period the effects dropped from .38 at full employment
to .24 at two percent unemployment whereafter they lost statistical significance. They
would not again have been significant until a 20 percent level had been reached -- a
figure well outside the range of observed values. Finally, in the third period the effect
dropped from .54 at full employment to .20 at five percent unemployment after which
it lost statistical significance which would not have returned until unemployment would
have been at around 19 percent (again, outside the range of observed values) when
its effect would have been approximately -.75.
Second, there is the interpretation one can give to the interaction parameters when
dealing with them as representing the change in the slope of the fiscal balance on
unemployment associated with a unit change in government partisanship. Table 2
summarizes the effects and reports as well on the statistical significance of these effects.
In reality, one can ignore, except for theoretical purposes, the columns labelled Far
Right and Far Left. The Far Right column would be a government with a partisan center
of gravity equal to zero, but the lowest observable value on the scale over the period
is .89, quite close to the Moderate Right value. The highest observable value is 3.0,
i.e., Moderate Left. No government could be characterized as Far Left during the during
the years included in this study. In period 1, Center and Moderate Left governments
had statistically significant coefficients whose values suggest commitments to pursuing
counter-cyclical fiscal policy with the center lowering the fiscal balance by .14 percent
for every increase in unemployment and the Moderate Left doing it at a rate nearly twice
as large as that. None of the parameters are statistically significant during the second
period. And in the third period it is only the Moderate Left that has shown any signs of
engaging in counter-cyclical policy. Note, however, the marked reduction in this
18 . Note that the computation of the standard errors on the parameter values here are
based on the variance-covariance matrix used in the PCSE estimation.
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commitment. Whereas in the first period every increase in unemployment was matched
by a .26 percent drop in the fiscal balance, during the third period the response rate
was less than half of that, namely, only .11 percent.
Table 2
Slope of Public Sector Balance on Unemployment
Under Different Types of Government
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Partisan Character of Government
Far Right Moderate Center Moderate Far Left
Right Left
Period 1 .10 -.02 -.14 -.26 -.38
(1.55) (-0.51) (-1.92) (-2.26) (-2.33)
Period 2 .10 .02 -.05 -.12 -.19
(1.55) (0.45) (-.73) (-1.23) (-1.44)
Period 3 .10 .03 -.04 -.11 -.17
(1.55) (0.70) (-1.04) (-1.86) (-2.05)
The graphics contained in Figure 1 help to illustrate what has gone on in terms of
the partisan basis of fiscal policy over the three decade period. In the relatively
successful time of the 1960s and early 1970s (see graph labelled Period 1),
left-dominated governments, when confronted with full or near full employment, were
particularly prone to taking a far more conservative fiscal stance than were governments
dominated by the right. Indeed, the latter were relatively lax in their fiscal stance.
However, left-dominated governments were very sensitive to unemployment levels and
would sharply relax fiscal policy in response to deterioration in the labor market. Right
dominated governments remained unmoved by such deterioration.
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Figure 1
Partisan Fiscal Stances Across Three Periods
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After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and with the onset of the first
oil-crisis, fiscal policy became far less distinguishable in terms of partisan-based
preferences than it had been in the previous decade (see graph labelled Period 2).
Certainly there were smaller partisan-based differences in the response to
unemployment and the differences in fiscal stance at full or near-full employment were
far less pronounced between the various types of governments. With the 1980s (see
graph labelled Period 3) no change in the partisan-based responsiveness of
governments to unemployment conditions occurred but there was a tendency for more
distinguishable fiscal stances under conditions of full or near-full employment. The
combination of these two tendencies was to push further out the point at which
left-dominated governments would take a more relaxed fiscal stance than
right-dominated governments.
Taken together, the results presented here help to clarify why so much
inconsistency has marked the results of previous studies. The linkage between
partisanship and fiscal outcomes cannot be revealed without taking into account the
conditions under which policy is being made. If, for example, labor markets are quite
tight, as they were in the 1960s, then there is every reason to expect that parties having
an incentive to use fiscal policy as a tool for stabilizing aggregate demand, in other
words, parties on the left, will be prone to run more restrictive fiscal policies than those
on the right. In other periods where unemployment is quite high, the reverse would be
true. Leftist parties would be more likely to run looser fiscal policies than those on the
right. And often there could appear to be no relationship between partisanship and
fiscal policy because with a shift in the level of unemployment toward some intermediate
value (as in the area around where the lines cross in the graphics of Figure 1) a party
of the left will have moved to a region shared by the right. But any further change in
unemployment makes the left’s fiscal stance distinguishable from the right. What
matters is the direction of that change. In sum, the partisan character of government
influences fiscal policy but the nature of that influence is conditional on unemployment.
In addition, the strength of this conditional linkage has not remained constant over
time. A research design that is based on the assumption that such constancy holds
might then fail to detect a relationship. Further, there are many other elements that
need to be taken into account when trying to assess the nature of the linkage between
partisanship and fiscal outcomes. So much of what finally transpires with the fiscal
balance is contingent on factors that cannot be fully known to those making policy nor
can they be fully controlled by them. To a significant extent these factors are the product
of many past decisions where partisanship played a role, but they work their effect
independently of what a governing party chooses to do in the short run.
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Conclusion
Does partisan politics play a role in fiscal policy? Yes, it has and continues to do
so. But that role has diminished. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is no
evidence that the left has behaved in an fiscally irresponsible way by persistently and
recklessly running deficits. If anything, governments on the left have conducted more
conservative fiscal policy under conditions of full or near-full employment than those
on the right.
For the right to have behaved in this way is understandable. It reflects the interests
of the right in an uncertain world where, through its own fiscal policy, it can tie the hands
of a leftist successor. Further, by creating deficits through tax cuts without proportional
spending cuts, it can both please its natural constituency with the former while appealing
to the interests of those who are advantaged by the latter.
The behavior of the left also reflects the interests of its constituencies. By its
willingness to set its fiscal stance in response to macroeconomic conditions, specifically,
conditions within the labor market, it has used systematically a policy tool that, at least
within the Keynesian framework, works to the advantage of its supporters. By taking
a looser fiscal stance under conditions of high unemployment, it may indeed help
stimulate demand and job creation; at the least it does not make a bad situation worse.
By tightening its stance during periods of high employment it both it helps to prevent
the economy from overheating and reduces the chances that public debt will become
unsustainable.
But the partisan-based difference in fiscal policy stances has narrowed in recent
decades. While the left still continues to take a more conservative stance under
conditions of full or near-full employment, its response when faced with moderate to
high levels of unemployment has diminished relative to its historical standards.
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